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Abstract: 
Recent trade negotiations have attracted much attention to the consequences of domestic support 
applied to agricultural markets.  In various markets, researchers have examined the economic 
effects of regimes and scenarios with less, or different forms of, domestic support including 
decoupled payments.  Here we examine the domestic support regimes for processed fruits and 
vegetables in the European Union (EU) where major policy changes were applied in 2001 and 
again in 2008.  The changes were billed as policy “reform” but no analysis has yet evaluated 
quantitatively the nature of what was reformed and what was not.  A simulation model is used 
here to assess the price, production, and welfare effects of policies that have been applied to the 
EU processing tomato industry.  Our results indicate that EU domestic support has increased EU 
tomato production by 7 to 12%, decreased production in other regions by 3 to 5%, and distorted 
the processing tomato market most during the period between 2001 and 2007.     
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 Domestic support reform?   
A closer look at the EU policies applied to processed fruits and vegetables 
 
1.  Introduction 
Much research has been devoted to understanding the economic consequences of reducing or 
decoupling domestic support applied to agricultural commodities (e.g., Hennessy, 1998; Sumner, 
2000; Young and Westcott, 2000; Blandford, 2001; Sumner, 2005; Goodwin and Mishra, 2006).  
Trade negotiations have included discussions about the type of domestic support used by 
members at the Uruguay and Doha Rounds under the auspices of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  One result of these discussions at the WTO was the formation of the “green box” and 
the identification of domestic support that was agreed to minimally distort agricultural 
production and trade.  Beginning in the 1990s, government assistance in agriculture has shifted 
away from price support and towards income support, yet this trend has not been consistent 
across all WTO members and all agricultural commodities (Sumner, 2003; Rude, 2007).   
In the United States, decoupled payments under the Agricultural Marketing Transition 
Act were introduced in the 1996 Farm Bill and have remained in subsequent Farm Bills.  In 
2003, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the European Union (EU) was reformed and a 
decoupled payment, known as the Single Farm Payment (SFP), was introduced for various 
animal products and field crops.  In 2006 the SFP replaced price support regimes for cotton and 
olive oil sectors.  Stuart (2005) and Roberts and Gunning-Trant (2006) examine agricultural 
sectors where decoupled payments had not replaced price supports, and highlighted the 
processed fruit and vegetable sectors in the EU.  In 2007 the EU decided to reduce price supports 
that had been maintained for key processed horticultural products and phase in the SFP between 
2008 and 2012.  Domestic support has been important for processing peaches, pears and 
tomatoes, citrus, prunes, dried figs, and dried grapes.  Here we focus on processing tomatoes as 
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 they have received the largest share of domestic support applied to processed horticultural 
products in the EU.        
Table 1 shows the quantity of tomatoes produced by five member states in the EU, 
California, and a rest-of-the-world region between 1978 and 2008.  The EU and California are 
the two largest producers of processing tomatoes and collectively account for approximately 
65% of global production.  Total tomato production in the EU has increased over this time period 
from 4.8 to 8.7 million metric tons, an increase of 81%.  Table 1 also shows that over the same 
time period, processing tomato production in California has increased from 4.8 to 10.7 thousand 
metric tons, an increase of 123%.  Tomato production in regions outside of California and the 
EU increased from 7.2 to approximately 14.0 million metric tons between 1995 and 2008, an 
increase of nearly 100%.   
Between 1995 and 2008 European production has clearly increased, yet most of the 
production increases in California occurred before 1995.  Average EU production during the 
period between 2003 and 2005 was nearly 20% higher than average production over the period 
between 1998 and 2000.  In California, average production during the 2003 to 2005 period was 
approximately equal to that during the 1998 to 2000 period.  During this time there were also 
significant policy changes applied to processed horticultural products in the EU; we develop a 
model to simulate the impact that these policy changes have had on processing tomato markets in 
the EU and elsewhere.   
2.  An Overview of the Policies Applied to the Processing Tomato Complex 
This research is motivated, in part, by the significant amount of government support and 
protection applied to EU fruit and vegetable industries (USITC, 2001; Strossman, 2003; Stuart, 
2005), most notable in the processing tomato industry.  EU policy applied to processing tomatoes 
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 can be separated into three time periods which are differentiated based on the type of domestic 
support employed.  Each regime will be described next to highlight the differences across the 
three regimes.   
The EU domestic support program in place between 1978 and 2000 was a complex 
regime that included quotas, processor aid, and minimum prices to growers of processing 
tomatoes (Commission of the European Communities, 1996).  The European Commission 
provided aid directly to tomato processors with the condition that processors paid growers a 
minimum price for processing tomatoes.  The processor aid (and hence the minimum price) was 
then limited to a maximum quantity.  The maximum quantity was referred to as a quota in EU 
sources, but to be more specific, we use the term entitlement quota.  The entitlement quota 
specified a fixed quantity of eligible processing tomatoes, was assigned to individual processing 
plants, and was non-transferable.  The total entitlement quota allocation was typically less than 
total production in the EU during the 1990s.  However, in many years, not all member states 
exceeded their national entitlement quota allocation, and many processing plants in the EU did 
not exceed their quota allocations.  Between 1978 and 2000, the total quota allocation increased 
as countries joined the EU.  
Beginning in 2001, EU domestic support included a 34.50 euro per ton payment to 
tomato growers (Commission of the European Communities, 2000).  The per-unit subsidy was 
approximately equivalent to an ad valorem subsidy of 43% in the market for processing tomatoes 
(given a subsidy of 34.50 euro and a final grower price of approximately 80 euros).  The subsidy 
was known as producer aid in the EU, and it is referred to as grower payments here to avoid 
confusion with the processor aid from the pre-2001 regime.  In 2001 grower payments were also 
introduced in the EU for processing peaches, pears and citrus; however, the processor aid and 
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 entitlement quota regime was maintained for prunes, dried figs, and dried grapes (Strossman, 
2003).     
The 2001 regime for processing tomatoes also included a “threshold” quantity for each 
nation.  Aggregate production in each nation relative to its threshold quantity served as a basis 
for adjusting payment rates in future years, but did not affect payment rates in any year.  In 
practice, growers in a region were only penalized if they collectively exceeded their threshold 
level by at least 10%, and the EU exceeded the total EU threshold level (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2000).  Therefore, the threshold quantity did not affect the incentives 
facing individual growers or processors.  The domestic support regime that was in place between 
2001 and 2007 continued a significant government outlay to owners of processing firms and 
tomato farmers in Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and France.  Between 1997 and 2007 the total 
government outlay for processing tomatoes ranged between 250 and 420 million euros annually 
(Brans, 2000; Strossman, 2003; De Belder and Brans, 2008) and was a large share of total 
revenue in the processing tomato industry.      
In 2007 the European Commission decided to extend the SFP to various processing fruits 
and vegetables that had previously received price support.  Processing tomatoes are set to receive 
two types of domestic support as the SFP is phased into existence between 2008 and 2011.  Part 
of the support will be a coupled payment that continues the program that existed between 2001 
and 2007 and is linked to production.  In addition, during the period 2008 to 2011 processing 
tomato growers will receive a decoupled payment based on historical payment levels which will 
not be tied to current levels of production (Commission of the European Communities, 2007).  
During the transition period between 2008 and 2011 the ratio of coupled to decoupled payments 
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 will be fixed; beyond 2011 EU growers will only receive a decoupled payment.  A similar policy 
transition was applied to the EU olive oil sector beginning in 2006.    
The effects of the three domestic support regimes applied to the EU processing tomato 
industry are examined here through a series of simulation experiments.  We examine the 
production effects that would result from removing price supports at five different points in time 
between 1997 and 2008.  The purpose of this analysis is not for economic history per se, but 
rather to facilitate a comparison of the 1978 to 2000 domestic support regime with the regimes 
that commenced in 2001 and in 2008.       
2.1  A closer examination of EU Processor Aid 
Some forms of domestic support are specified in ad valorem terms, and others can be converted 
to ad valorem equivalents.  The domestic support regime that was in place in the EU between 
2001 and 2007 was essentially a per-unit subsidy, and modeling it as an ad valorem equivalent 
captures the crux of the policy details.  Modeling the partially decoupled regime that began in 
2008 is also relatively straight-forward.  However, calculating an ad valorem equivalent becomes 
more difficult as the complexity of, and the constraints on, a particular policy regime increase.  
The domestic support regime that was applied to processing tomatoes in the EU between 1978 
and 2000 is one example.  In this case, an understanding of, and properly modeling, the policy is 
required to accurately assess the economic consequences.      
The domestic support regime that was applied to the processing tomato industry in the 
EU prior to 2001 included a government payment to processors (processor aid) and a legislated 
minimum price that processors paid to growers.  Furthermore, a non-transferable entitlement 
quota that was plant-specific, restricted the quantity that was eligible for the payments and 
minimum prices.  The production effects of this regime varied across processors, and depended 
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 on plant-level characteristics.  Because of the complexities of this policy regime and its 
dependence of plant-level characteristics, the domestic support regime prior to 2001 cannot be 
easily modeled in ad valorem equivalent terms.     
Our understanding of the EU domestic support regimes is based on the published EU 
regulations, and was further developed through discussions with industry sources (Amézaga, 
2002).  Two main sources of complexity need to be addressed and included in the model.  First, 
the domestic support regime that was in place between 1978 and 2000 did not affect all 
processors across EU member states equally.  More specifically, the effects of the domestic 
support regime prior to 2001 varied across processing plants, and depended on the ratio of 
production to entitlement quota.  Second, the analysis is complicated by the fact that many 
processors actually paid an average price for processing tomatoes rather than the minimum price 
for in-quota processing tomatoes and another (lower) price for over-quota processing tomatoes. 
To address the first complexity, the simulation model needs to accommodate 
disaggregate plant-level production data in the EU.  One way to disaggregate the data is to 
classify processing plants into three groups: those that produced less than, at, and greater than 
their quota entitlement quantity.  A similar framework was used by Frandsen et al. (2003) and 
Witzke and Heckelei (2002), to examine policy reform scenarios in the EU sugar market.     
For all three groups, EU domestic support prior to 2001 reduced the processors’ net 
marginal costs for the entitlement quota quantity in the market for processed tomato products.  In 
a vertically linked market with fixed factor proportions, the marginal cost in an output market is 
the sum of marginal costs from input markets.  Any change in the marginal cost for processed 
products will have implications in input markets.  Figure 1 provides a stylized illustration of the 
net marginal costs in this industry; the group with the highest net marginal cost is also the group 
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 that produced less than entitlement quota, and although this may not be the case for all high cost 
plants, it is believed to be approximately true for the group as a whole.  The net marginal cost for 
the group that produced less than the entitlement quota is depicted as MCL; MCA represents the 
net marginal cost for the group that produced at quota and MCG represents the net marginal cost 
for the group with production that was greater than the quota entitlement.   
In Figure 1, Θc is used to represent the entitlement quota allocation for group c, where c 
∈ [L, A, G].  For each group, the net marginal cost function (MCc) shifts up for quantities beyond 
the entitlement quota.  The effects are illustrated in the output market because observations on 
the price are available, and the price in the output market is approximately constant across the 
three groups in the EU (P0 represents the initial equilibrium price of the processed product in 
Figure 1).  The intersection of the equilibrium price, P0, and the relevant net marginal cost for 
group c is the quantity produced by that group, denoted as Qc.  Removing domestic support (and 
thus increasing the net marginal costs for the entitlement quota quantity) would have reduced 
production by the group producing less than quota (QL), and by the group producing at the quota 
quantity (QA); however, processor aid is partially infra-marginal for group A, as the production 
effect is dampened by the presence of the entitlement quota.             
For the group that is producing at quantities greater than quota entitlement, it would 
appear that the processor aid is infra-marginal.  Since production is greater than entitlement 
quota in group G, any change in processor aid would affect net marginal costs for quantities less 
than the entitlement quota in group G, but not the net marginal costs for quantities greater than 
the entitlement quota in group G.  If the processor aid only applied to the in-quota production, 
removal of the policy would leave production among processors in group G at QG.  However, the 
analysis needs to address the second source of complexity and incorporate the observation that 
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 the benefits of the domestic support regime were not only provided to the in-quota quantities in 
group G.  Processing firms in this group pooled the processor aid benefits across the total 
quantity supplied by group G.  The pooling of processor aid benefits yielded an average net 
marginal cost curve (or a pooled net marginal cost curve), represented as MCGpool in Figure 1.  In 
this case, production with the domestic support regime in place would have been QGpool, and 
removing the policy (while holding price constant) would have decreased production for this 
group as well.   
Figure 2 outlines the aggregate production effects of the processor aid applied to 
processing tomatoes in the EU.  The bold line in Figure 2 shows the aggregate marginal cost for 
the three groups under the regime that applied prior to 2001.  The equilibrium price (with the 
pre-2001 domestic support regime in place) is determined in the aggregate market (Figure 2) and 
is also shown in Figure 1.  Additionally, Figure 2 shows that total production would have fallen 
if the pre-2001 domestic support regime was removed (total production would fall from Q0 to 
QNo).  Figure 2 also shows what the marginal cost of the processed tomato product would have 
been if the processor aid was applied at the full rate (as it did for group L) for all groups; in this 
case total production under the pre-2001 regime would have been QFull in Figure 2.   
2.2  Understanding the production effects of EU Processor Aid 
EU processor aid affects production in the three groups differently, and the total impact in the 
market for EU processed tomato products is a weighted sum of the individual effects.  To assess 
the total impact we need to characterize the production effects in each group and the share of 
production that originates from each group.  The production effects in groups A and G are 
different but are both partially infra-marginal whereas the full effect of processor aid is applied 
in group L.  Calculating the share of production from each group is complicated because 
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 production and entitlement quota data is only available at the EU member state level and each 
member state includes some processors in each group classification.    
The net marginal cost of the processed tomato product in group c in region y is equal to 
the vertical sum of net marginal costs in the input markets.  Our notation uses subscript j to 
denote an output market and subscript i to denote an input market.  In Equation (1) AIDjy  
represents a vertical shift in the net marginal cost of processed product j in region y due to the 
processor aid applied under the pre-2001 domestic support regime.  The rate at which processor 
aid affects marginal costs for product j in group c in region y is characterized by Φjcy.    
(1)  MCjcy = ∑i MCicy – Φjcy AIDjcy 
In group L the processor aid is not infra-marginal; therefore the rate of processor aid 
applied to product j for group L in region y, denoted as ΦjLy, is set at 1.0.  The applied rate is less 
than 1.0 in group A and group G; we set ΦjGy according to the degree to which the processor aid 
is pooled across the quantity supplied by the group that produced beyond quota entitlement.  For 
the group producing at a level greater than quota entitlement, the total value of the processor aid 
payment is spread across total production in group G (QGpool).  As a result, the effective amount 
of processor aid per unit of processed product is reduced to a level that equates the total payment 
across total production.  Equation (2) shows the calculation used to characterize the applied rate 
of processor aid in group G.   
(2) ΦjGy = ΘG/QG 
The total supply of the processed tomato product is the vertical sum of marginal costs for 
inputs and the horizontal sum of net marginal costs across the groups, assuming that firm-level 
entry and exit decisions do not affect costs for other firms.  The line labeled MCNo Aid in Figure 2 
illustrates the total marginal cost with no processor aid and the line labeled MCFull Aid shows what 
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 the total marginal cost would be for the processed product if the processor aid was not infra-
marginal in any group.  Adding net marginal costs across the three groups generates nine distinct 
subsections in the aggregate marginal cost shown by the bold line in Figure 2.  Moving along the 
bold line from left to right illustrates how the total marginal cost increases as production in each 
group increases.  Equation (3) shows the calculation used to characterize the total marginal cost 
for the processed tomato product in region y.  
(3)  MCjy = ∑i ∑c (MCicy – γjcyΦjcyAIDjcy) 
The key component in this calculation is the net effect that EU processor aid had on the 
total marginal cost of producing processed tomato products.  This parameter is determined by the 
rate at which processor aid was applied to each group, denoted as Φjcy, and the share of 
production generated by each group, denoted as γjcy.  The effective ad valorem rate of the 
processor aid in the market for processed tomato products is shown as αjy  in Figure 2; the value 
of αjy is embedded in Equation (3) and reproduced in Equation (4).    
(4) αjy = ∑c γjcyΦjcy  
Since the entitlement quota was assigned to individual processing plants in the EU, data 
describing the share of production from each group (i.e., γjcy) would be the ideal unit of 
observation.  However, data are not available on the share of EU processing plants that produced 
less than, at, and greater than entitlement quota.  Production and entitlement quota data are 
available for member states, but not at the plant level.  In 1997, Italy and Greece were the EU 
countries with the highest production of processing tomatoes and had the highest ratio of 
production to entitlement quota.  By 2000 Italy and Spain were largest tomato-producing 
member states and had the highest production to entitlement quota ratios.  Over this time period 
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 France and Portugal were the EU member states that produced the least amount of processing 
tomatoes, and the countries with the lowest ratio of production to entitlement quota.   
Data describing production levels for member states (AMITOM, 2008) are combined 
with information from industry sources to calculate each group’s share of total EU production.  
Table 2 shows the production and quota quantities for member states in 1997 and 2000; data in 
1997 are used to describe patterns in the mid-1990s and data from 2000 describe patterns in the 
late-1990s.  In 2000, approximately 60% of production in Italy and Spain, and 20% of 
production in Greece, Portugal, and France is expected to have been in the group producing 
greater than quota.  Approximately 60% of production in Greece, and 20 to 30% of production in 
the other countries is expected to have been in the group producing at quota.  Hence, 
approximately 60% of production in Portugal and France, and between 10 and 20% of 
production in the other countries is expected to have been in the group producing less than quota.  
Table 2 also shows that fewer plants processed in excess of quota allocations and a greater share 
operated at levels below quota entitlements in 1997 relative to 2000.  
3.  Simulation Model 
A simulation model is developed here that allows us to examine the impacts of various domestic 
support measures that have been applied to processed fruit and vegetable products in the EU.  
Following work by Feenstra (1986), Desquilbet and Guyomard (2002), and Rickard and Sumner 
(2008) a model is developed to consider changes in taxes and subsidies that apply to vertically 
linked products.  This nested model allows for a direct comparison of policies that apply to 
processed products or inputs used to manufacture processed products, and facilitates a discussion 
of policy reform in the processing tomato industry in the EU.  The simulation experiments 
employed here examine the production and trade effects of the three domestic support regimes 
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 that have been applied to EU processing tomatoes between 1978 and 2008.  While the focus of 
our results will be for Europe, we also highlight the implications for processing tomato markets 
in the United States and a residual rest-of-the-world region that includes all countries outside of 
the EU and the United States.     
The model considers three regions, two inputs, and five outputs.   The three regions are 
the European Union (E), United States (U), and rest of the world (R).  Inputs include the farm-
produced commodity (F) and marketing and processing services (M).  Processed tomato products 
at the wholesale level include two bulk canned tomato products and three bulk tomato paste 
products.  Product J1 is canned tomato products produced and exported by the EU, J2 is canned 
tomato products produced and exported by the United States, J3 is the tomato paste product 
produced and exported by the EU, J4 is the tomato paste product produced and exported by the 
United States, and J5 is the tomato paste product produced and exported by the rest-of-the-world 
region and imported into the EU duty-free.  The various processed tomato products utilize the 
same inputs in production, although in different proportions. 
Rickard and Sumner (2008) provide a system of equations to describe supply, demand, 
and market clearing conditions for an industry that includes policy parameters along a vertical 
market chain.  An equilibrium displacement model was developed by totally differentiating the 
system of equations and converting them to elasticity form.  The simulation model is reproduced 
below and is employed to solve the proportional changes in quantities and prices as functions of 
various elasticity and share parameters.       
In equation (5) through (12), the term Q is used to denote a quantity in an output market, 
X denotes a quantity in an input market, P denotes a price in an output market, and W denotes a 
price in an input market.  For prices in input markets and quantities in input and output markets, 
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 the suffix D denotes a variable on the demand side, and the suffix S denotes a variable on the 
supply side.  Equilibrium adjustments can be simulated by exogenously specifying changes in 
the policy parameters.  In the following equations, for any variable A, E(A) represents the relative 
change in A, that is, E(A) represents dA/A where d refers to a total differential.   
(5)  E(QDjy) = ηjjyE(Pjy) + ∑k ≠ jηjkyE(Pky) 
(6) E(XDhjy) = E(QSjy) + ∑i  ≠ hκijyσjy[E(WDiy) – E(WDhy)]  
(7)  E(XShy) = εhyE(WShy) 
(8)  E(Pjy) = ∑hκhjyE(WDhy) + E(1+αjy) 
(9)   E(Pjy) = E(Pjw) + E(1+βjy) 
(10)  E(WShy) = E(WDhy) + E(1+δhy) 
(11)  E(QDjy) = (QSjy/QDjy)E(QSjy) + ∑z ≠ y[(QSjz/QDjy)E(QSjz) – (QDjz/QDjy)E(QDjz)] 
(12) E(XShy) = ∑jλhjyE(XDhjy) 
 Equation (5) describes the relationship between changes in price and consumption of 
processed products.  The price elasticity of demand for processed product j with respect to the 
price of another processed product k in region y, is represented by ηjky.  Equation (6) outlines the 
linkage between changes in input and output quantities.  The cost share of input h in the 
production of j in region y is denoted as κhjy and the Allen partial elasticity of input substitution 
for producing j, in region y, is denoted by σjy.  Equation (7) shows how input price changes affect 
input quantities; here the own-price elasticity of supply of input h in region y is represented by 
εhy.  Equations (8), (9), and (10) are used to determine prices; equation (8) is used to determine 
output prices in production regions, equation (9) is used to determine output prices in 
consumption regions, and equation (10) is used to determine prices in input markets.  Equation 
(11) is the international market clearing condition for output markets and Equation (12) is the 
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 market clearing condition for the input markets.  The industry share of input h used in the 
production of j in region y is λhjy.  The model with five outputs, two inputs, and three regions 
(with trade in the output markets) yields a system of ninety-three equations.   
Three policy parameters are included in the simulation model: αjy in Equation (8) 
represents the ad valorem price wedge created by a subsidy applied to product j by region y; βjy 
in Equation (9) represents the ad valorem price wedge created by a border measure applied to 
product j by region y; and δhy in Equation (10) represents the ad valorem price wedge created by 
a subsidy applied to input h by region y. 
The results from the simulation model also yield changes in measures of economic 
welfare.  The changes in economic welfare accruing to consumers of product j in region y 
(ΔCSjy) and to the factors of production in region y (ΔPShy) are measured in terms of changes in 
factor and product prices and quantities.     
(13) ΔCSjy = –PjyQDjyE(Pjy)[1 + 0.5E(QDjy)]  
(14) ΔPShy =  WShyXShyE(WShy)[1 + 0.5E(XShy)] 
The change in total producer surplus in region y is the sum of the producer surplus from 
each factor market, ΔPSy = ∑h(ΔPShy), and the change in the total consumer surplus in region y is 
the sum of the consumer surplus from each output markets, ΔCSy = ∑j(ΔCSjy).   
The change in net surplus for region y depends on the change in taxpayer surplus, and 
taxpayer surplus changes are comprised of two components.  Equation (15) includes the welfare 
effects for taxpayers in region y from changes in border measures and in domestic support 
applied in output market j.  Equation (16) includes the welfare effects for taxpayers in region y 
from changes in domestic support applied in input market h.  Equation (17) shows the total 
change in taxpayer surplus in region y.     
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 (15) ΔTSj y = PjyQTjy[E(Pjy) + E(QTjy) + E(Pjy)E(QTjy)]  
   – PjwQTjy[E(Pjw) + E(QTjy) + E(Pjw)E(QTjy)] 
 – PjyQSjy(αjy)  
(16) ΔTSh y = WDhyXShy[E(WDhy) + E(XShy) + E(WDhy)E(XShy)] 
– WShyXShy[E(WShy) + E(XShy) + E(WShy)E(XShy)]     
(17) ΔTSy = ∑j(ΔTSj y) + ∑h(ΔTSh y)  
Although border measures do not change in the simulation experiments used here, 
changes in taxpayer surplus will accrue if tariffs are applied to processed products.  If a change 
in domestic support affects the quantity traded, it will also have an indirect effect on the amount 
of tariff revenue generated.  Equation (18) shows the calculation used to describe the net traded 
quantity for each product in each region regardless of whether the region imports or exports.  
Equation (19) represents the change in net surplus in region y (ΔNSy).   
(18) E(QTjy) = (QSjy/QSjy – QDjy)E(QSjy) – (QDjy/QSjy – QDjy)E(QDjy)  
 (19) ΔNSy = ∑j(ΔCSjy) + ∑h(ΔPShy) + ΔTSy   
Reductions in the EU domestic support regime that applied in 1997 and 2000 are 
modeled as reductions in the ad valorem subsidy received by tomato processors; reductions in 
the regime that applied in 2001, 2007, and 2008 are modeled as reductions in the ad valorem 
subsidy paid to growers of processing tomatoes.  We simulate separately the effects of removing 
EU domestic support at five different points in time.  The results from the simulation model will 
describe the changes in prices, quantities, and welfare measures across the various output 
products, factors of production, and regions.   
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 3.1  Model Parameterization 
Our simulation model requires several parameters to describe the global processing tomato 
market.  Elasticity parameters are needed for the supply of each input, the demand for each 
output, and the substitution possibilities between inputs; parameters are also needed for input 
shares, initial equilibrium quantities, cost shares, and policy shocks. The simulation model is 
used to assess five different policy experiments; each experiment examines a policy change in a 
particular year.  Some parameters may remain constant throughout the experiments (e.g., demand 
elasticities for processed tomato products) while other experiments will require parameters that 
are specific to the year being studied (e.g., initial quantities).  The full set of baseline parameters 
for supply, demand, and substitution elasticities, and shares are contained in Table 3, and each is 
discussed in detail below.  Table 4 shows the initial quantities that were used in each of the five 
experiments.   
Applying work by Davis and Espinoza (1998) and Zhao et al. (2000) prior distributions 
are applied to selected baseline parameters to understand the sensitivity of our results.  A central 
tendency (equal to the baseline parameter) and a variance of 0.04 is specified and used to 
develop beta (3,3) distributions that are applied to all supply, demand, and substitution 
elasticities.  The beta distributions selected here constrain demand elasticities to be negative and 
supply elasticities and substitution elasticities to be positive.  The simulation model draws values 
for these parameters to generate an empirical distribution of results.  The empirical distribution 
includes the results from 1000 iterations of the simulation model.  No prior distributions are 
applied to parameter values that were based on information supplied by industry sources such as 
cost and industry shares, or parameters describing initial quantities.   
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 The own- and cross-price elasticities of demand were calculated following an Armington 
specification (Armington, 1969).  The calculation used to parameterize the Armington own-price 
elasticity of demand is shown in equation (20) and the calculation used to parameterize the 
Armington cross-price elasticities of demand is shown in equation (21).  A summary of 
parameters used in the Armington specification are listed in Table 3.       
(20)   ηjjy = ζjyηy – (1 – ζjy)σy 
(21)  ηjky = ζky(ηy + σy) 
 The own-price elasticity of demand for product j is represented by ηjjy, and ηjky represents 
the cross-price elasticity of demand for product j with respect to the price of product k.  In 
equations (20) and (21), ηy is the overall elasticity of demand for processed tomato products in 
country y.  The Armington specification also requires the elasticity of substitution (across the 
processed products) for each consuming region, represented by σy, and the share of consumption 
devoted to product j in region y.  Information on consumption shares, represented by ζjy, is 
derived from industry sources (Amézaga, 2002; Morning Star, 2008).  The supply elasticities for 
each input in each region were drawn from distributions with specified means and variances that 
reflect decisions made in the intermediate-run.   
Table 5 outlines the information used to calculate the EU ad valorem level of support in 
the processing tomato sector in selected years.  Domestic support parameters are required for the 
EU only, as no domestic support was directly applied to processing tomato sectors in the other 
regions.  The top section of Table 5 shows the parameters used to calculate the effective rates of 
support for EU processed tomato products (αJ1E and αJ3E) in 1997 and 2000.  In both years we 
examine the effect of processor aid in the three groups and then calculate the weighted effect for 
the EU processed tomato product market.  The proportion of processing plants that were 
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 considered to fit into each of the groups are listed in the second column of Table 5.  Overall, the 
shares are an approximation and used to reflect the idea that a greater proportion of plants 
produced at quantities greater than entitlement quota in 2000 relative to 1997.  The level of 
processor aid and the processed product price (for tomato paste) are constant across the groups in 
each year; however, the applied rate of support varies across groups depending on the amount of 
support that is infra-marginal.  In our baseline simulation model in 1997 and 2000, the applied 
rate of support for group L is 100% and 50% for group A.  Following Equation (4) the weighted 
sum of applied rates across the three groups is 0.89 in 1997 and 0.64 in 2000.  The weighted sum 
is higher in 1997 for two reasons; first, group L generates a greater share of production in 1997 
and second, the processor aid as a share of product price is higher in 1997.    
The bottom section of Table 5 outlines the parameters used to calculate the effective rate 
of support for processing tomatoes (denoted as δFE) after 2000.  All growers received a payment 
of €34.50 per ton of processing tomatoes in 2001; by 2007 growers in Spain had exceeded the 
Spanish national threshold quantity and their payment was reduced by 10%.  Given Spain’s share 
of tomato production in the EU, the applied rate of support in the EU was reduced slightly in 
2007.  Each year between 2001 and 2011 price support applies to tomato production; the ad 
valorem rate of EU support in any year is the payment’s share of the price received by growers.  
The final column in the lower section of Table 5 shows the effective rates of price support for 
EU processing tomatoes between 2001 and 2012. 
4.  Results 
Assessing the effects of switching EU domestic support regimes is complicated because 
observations of a no-policy period do not exist.  Therefore, we report the results for simulations 
where EU domestic support is eliminated at five different points in time.  We consider the effects 
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 of eliminating the domestic support regime in 1997 and in 2000; we also model the implications 
of removing the price support that was in place in 2001, 2007, and 2008.  The proportional and 
quantity effects calculated from the simulation experiments are used to compare the degree of 
distortion associated with each regime.  Each simulation imposes a policy shock to the system of 
equations and generates empirical distributions for the changes in prices and quantities, and 
associated welfare measures, for the two inputs and the five processed products.  The empirical 
distributions are used to calculate the mean and a 95% confidence interval for price, quantity, 
and welfare variables across 1000 iterations.   
Table 6 shows the mean price and quantity effects from each scenario for inputs and 
products in each region.  The first column of results examines the implications of removing the 
processor aid in 1997.   Here, results show that the removal of processor aid in 1997 would have 
decreased the EU tomato price by 26.1% and decreased EU tomato production by 12.9%.   
Reducing tomato production by 13% would have decreased EU production from 6.8 million tons 
to 5.9 million tons in 1997.  Less tomato production would lead to 21.9% less canned tomato 
production and 8.4% less tomato paste production in the EU.  Production decreases in canned 
tomatoes and paste depend on input share usage and substitution possibilities between both 
inputs and output products.  Elimination of processor aid in 1997 would generate significant 
losses for EU producers and consumers, but the combined loss would have been outweighed by 
reduced taxpayer expenditures and yielded a net surplus gain in the EU of €83.1 million.  
Outside of the EU, removing the processor aid would increase prices and production of tomatoes 
and processed tomato products; it would also generate €49.4 million annually in additional 
producer surplus for U.S. and ROW growers and processors.   
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 Between 1997 and 2000 the ad valorem rate of EU domestic support fell from 27.8% to 
15.8% and this is evident in the effects shown for elimination of processor aid in 2000.  The 
second column in Table 6 indicates that production of tomatoes and tomato products would 
decrease in the EU and increase elsewhere, yet the effects are smaller than those reported in 
1997.  Elimination of the processor aid in 2000 would have decreased EU tomato production 
from 8.4 million tons to 7.8 million tons; U.S. production would have increased by 0.1 million 
tons and ROW production would have increased by 0.2 million tons.  The overall reduction in 
tomato production due to removal of the processor aid in 2000 would have decreased global 
consumer surplus by €150.1 million.  Overall, the pattern of simulated effects is linked to the 
proportion of production that was considered infra-marginal during each period.  In 1997 a 
greater share of total production was in group L, the group where the support was most 
production-distorting.  By 2000, there were fewer producers in group L and more processors 
producing at or above quota entitlement where the policy effects were only partially infra-
marginal.    
 The final three columns in Table 6 show price, quantity, and welfare results for scenarios 
without the payments paid to EU tomato growers in 2001, 2007, and 2008.  Results in the third 
column show that tomato production would have fallen by 9.1%, or 0.8 million tons, and EU 
producer surplus would have decreased by €159.9 million in the absence of grower payments in 
2001.  Removing EU grower payments in 2001 would have increased tomato production in the 
United States by 0.8% and in the ROW by 1.9%, or equivalently by 0.3 tons across both regions.  
Again, similar to the removal of the processor aid, elimination of the grower payment would 
increase non-EU producer surplus and decrease non-EU consumer surplus.  The results in the 
fourth column show the results for removing grower payments in 2007; here the results track 
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 those from 2001 quite closely, however, elimination of the grower payment in 2007 would lead 
to slightly smaller production effects in the EU and elsewhere.  In 2008 the EU regime replaced 
part of the price support with a decoupled payment, and both were paid to growers of tomatoes.  
The final column of results shows that the removal of the price support that remained in 2008 
would have led to 3.9% less tomato production in the EU.  Removing the partially decoupled 
regime in 2008 would also increase tomato production in regions outside of Europe, but to a 
lesser degree than would a fully coupled regime.  For simplicity, we assume that the decoupled 
component of support in 2008 did not distort EU production.  
The domestic support regime applied in 1997 led to an additional 0.9 million tons in the 
EU; this additional EU production during 1997 was equivalent to about 4% of global tomato 
supply.  In 2000 the processor aid increased EU tomato production by 0.6 million tons.  
Furthermore, removal of EU support would have increased tomato production outside of the EU 
by 0.4 million tons in 1997 and by 0.3 million tons in 2000.   The EU support paid directly to 
growers in the latter period increased EU production by 0.8 million tons in 2001 and by 0.7 
million tons in 2007.  The net effect of switching domestic support regimes in 2001 increased 
EU production and EU producer welfare, yet it was relatively insignificant for producers in the 
United States and negligible for producers in the ROW-region.  Overall, the net effect of 
switching regimes in 2001 increased production of EU processing tomatoes by approximately 
0.2 million tons per year.       
In addition, although removal of processor aid reduced production of canned tomatoes 
and paste in the EU, removal of the grower payments did not affect EU processed products 
equally.   Removal of domestic support would always have led to less tomato and paste 
production in the EU, yet during the period after 2000 our results show that elimination of the 
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 grower payments would lead to more canned tomato production in the EU.  Processor aid, a 
payment applied to processed products, encouraged EU processing plants to overproduce paste.  
Once the support was applied to tomatoes the incentive for some processors to produce paste was 
diminished and we see tomato use shifting from paste to canned tomato products.   
5.  Policy Implications 
The primary beneficiaries of EU domestic support applied to the processing tomato market were 
consumers of processed tomato products in all regions and European producers.  EU taxpayers 
and producers in non-EU regions would benefit most from eliminating EU domestic support.  
The decrease in EU production simulated here (as a result of removing domestic support) 
reduced the amount of processed tomato products available globally and reduced welfare for 
consumers in all regions.  In fact, the large decrease in consumer surplus led to a reduction in net 
welfare in the United States and the ROW.  However, the net change in global welfare was 
positive in each year due to the increase in net EU welfare.  The relatively small changes in 
taxpayer expenditures in non-EU regions resulted from changes in tariff revenues associated with 
less global trade in processed tomato products.    
Our simulation experiments that examine reform of EU domestic support in the 
processing tomato sector highlight three interesting results.  First, the impacts for consumers in 
all regions were largest with the domestic support regime that applied prior to 2001.  Domestic 
support applied to downstream products diverts a greater share of benefits to processors.  Once 
the domestic support was applied to upstream products, the benefits are redistributed to 
producers.  Second, processing tomato policy was on a path to reform between 1997 and 2000 
and the trend was reversed in 2001.  Relative to the pre-2001 regime, the domestic support 
regime used between 2001 and 2007 reduced costs to EU consumers; however, it did not lead to 
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 greater overall economic efficiency in the EU.  Third, price support that applies to a menu of 
processed products will lead to an inefficient allocation of inputs across the products.  Shifting 
price support from output markets to input markets decreases the incentives to overproduce 
certain processed products.  Furthermore, as input substitution possibilities increase between 
processed products, any shift of support from processors to growers will lead to a greater 
reallocation of tomatoes to their best use.   
This research explored the evolution of domestic support regimes that have applied to 
different agricultural products along the supply chain in the processing tomato sector.  It also 
contributes to a better understanding of the impact that EU policies have had in global 
horticultural markets.  We examine the processing tomato sector here as it is important crop 
outside of Europe and it has received the largest share of EU support among processed 
horticultural crops.  However, our general results would also apply to EU support that has 
applied to other processed fruit and vegetable sectors including peaches, pears, plums, figs, 
raisins, and citrus.  The question of agricultural policy reform is examined here in detail and the 
degree of policy reform in the EU processing tomato market is complicated for two reasons.  
First, EU domestic support for horticultural products has been applied to different products along 
the supply chain, and second, much of the support prior to 2001 was infra-marginal.  It appears 
that the transition to decoupled payments in 2008 will reduce production distortions in the 
processing tomato sector.  However, the regime that was in place between 2001 and 2007 clearly 
stimulated additional production relative to the regime that was in place in 2000.  Switching to 
the SFP in 2001 would have been the clearest path for reform, yet introducing the fully 
decoupled payment in 2012 might be considered a second best path to reform.   
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 Table 1.  Production of processing tomatoes: 1978 to 2008  
 
Year Italy Spain Portugal Greece France EU California ROW
   
(thousand metric tons) 
1978 2,220 586 612 1,029 363 4,810 4,798 
1979 3,477 553 553 1,084 383 6,050 5,760 
1980 2,962 541 454 1,445 399 5,801 5,025 
1981 3,007 568 387 1,124 406 5,492 4,444 
1982 3,038 585 487 1,008 375 5,493 5,578 
1983 4,183 654 558 1,075 304 6,774 5,415 
1984 5,765 743 731 1,484 355 9,078 5,977 
1985 3,899 746 742 1,318 392 7,097 5,533 
1986 2,917 473 542 706 242 4,880 5,878 
1987 2,928 573 421 825 234 4,981 6,077 
1988 3,131 679 456 961 277 5,504 5,941 
1989 3,857 818 617 1,308 323 6,923 7,791 
1990 3,560 1,022 823 1,059 322 6,786 8,444 
1991 3,426 845 706 1,129 321 6,427 8,971 
1992 3,222 790 447 913 247 5,619 7,193 
1993 3,505 961 501 1,028 236 6,231 8,118 
1994 3,683 1,279 865 111 276 6,214 9,751 
1995 3,535 916 831 1,177 281 6,740 9,624 7,163
1996 4,198 1,183 905 1,311 285 7,882 9,669 7,886
1997 3,665 990 722 1,183 286 6,846 8,472 8,173
1998 4,352 1,182 988 1,248 328 8,098 8,063 6,709
1999 4,932 1,510 999 1,250 372 9,063 11,102 9,133
2000 4,835 1,318 855 1,062 314 8,384 9,333 10,716
2001 4,806 1,463 917 939 298 8,423 7,837 10,376
2002 4,300 1,670 834 860 240 7,904 10,032 8,762
2003 5,300 1,713 894 927 249 9,083 8,390 12,018
2004 6,300 2,167 1,171 1,187 223 11,048 10,585 13,503
2005 5,200 2,611 1,202 880 200 10,093 8,707 14,497
2006 4,800 1,579 1,200 1,000 200 8,779 9,161 13,472
2007 4,600 1,650 1,000 860 150 10,957 8,260 13,866
2008a 4,800 1,900 1,000 1,000 150 11,200 8,850 14,000
 
Sources: AMITOM, 2008; CTGA, 2008. 
a Production estimates. 
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Table 2.  Processor aid, minimum prices, and quota entitlements: 1997 and 2000a 
 
Country 
 
 
Year Processor 
Aidb 
(€ per ton)
Minimum 
Price
(€ per ton)
Entitlement 
quota 
(metric tons) 
Tomato 
production 
(metric tons)
Italy 1997 
2000 
 
268
172
94
88
3,472 
3,910 
3,520
4,400
Spain 1997 
2000 
 
268
172
94
88
1,006 
1,011 
981
1,382
Portugal 1997 
2000 
 
268
172
94
88
940 
940 
772
970
Greece 1997 
2000 
 
268
172
94
88
1,049 
1,078 
1,245
1,290
France 1997 
2000 
 
268
172
94
88
370 
299 
286
330
EU 1997 
2000 
 
268
172
94
88
6,836 
6,938 
6,804
8,372
 
Source:  AMITON, 2008.   
 
a Nominal prices are reported for processor aid payments and minimum prices. 
 
b Processor aid levels shown here are applied to tomato paste; approximately 6.1 units of 
processing tomatoes are used to produce one unit of tomato paste.  Per ton processor aid 
payments were prorated by the EU Commission for canned tomato products. 
 Table 3. Baseline parameters used in the simulation modelsa, b 
 
Parameter description Parameter 
notation 
Baseline parameter value
Overall price elasticity 
of demand for processed 
tomato products 
ηy E= –0.3, U= –0.5, R= –0.7 
Consumption share of 
product j  
ζjE 
ζjU 
ζjR 
J1=0.37, J2=0.01, J3=0.51, J4=0.02, J5=0.09
J1=0.02, J2=0.10, J3=0.02, J4=0.86, J5=0.01
J1=0.02, J2=0.01, J3=0.09, J4=0.04, J5=0.84
Elasticity of substitution 
between processed 
products 
σy E= 5, U= 7, R= 10 
Price elasticity of supply 
for input h 
εFy 
εMy 
E=0.5, U=0.5, R=0.6
E=1.0, U=1.0, R=1.5
Cost share for input F in 
the production of j   
 
κFjE 
κFjU 
κFjR 
J1=0.15, J3=0.45
J2=0.17, J4=0.50
J5=0.40
Industry share of inputs 
used in the production  
of j  
λjE 
λjU 
λjR 
J1=0.39, J3=0.61
J2=0.10, J4=0.90
J5=1.0
Elasticity of substitution 
between inputs for 
processed product j  
σjy 0.1 (for all processed products in all regions)
 
a There are five processed tomato products in our model: J1 represents a canned tomato product 
produced and exported by the EU; J2 represents a canned tomato product produced and exported 
by the United States; J3 represents a tomato paste product produced and exported by the EU; J4 
represents a tomato paste product produced and exported by the United States; and J5 represents 
a tomato paste product produced and exported by the rest-of-the-world region. 
b Prior distributions were used for price elasticities of demand and supply, and all elasticities of 
substitution.  Values shown represent the mean used in the beta (3,3) distribution.  
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 Table 4. Baseline quantities used in the simulation modelsa 
 
Parameter description Year Parameter 
notation 
Baseline parameter value
Initial equilibrium 
quantity  
supplied of product j 
1997 QSjE 
QSjU 
QSjR 
J1=2.5, J3=4.5
J2=0.5, J4=8.0 
J5=8.2
Initial equilibrium 
quantity  
demanded of product j 
1997 QDjE 
QDjU 
QDjR 
J1=2.20, J2=0.01, J3=3.30, J4=0.20, J5=0.75
J1=0.15, J2=0.45, J3=0.20, J4=7.40, J5=0.05
J1=0.15, J2=0.04, J3=1.00, J4=0.40, J5=7.20
Initial equilibrium 
quantity  
supplied of product j 
2000 QSjE 
QSjU 
QSjR 
J1=3.0, J3=5.5
J2=0.6, J4=8.7 
J5=10.7
Initial equilibrium 
quantity  
demanded of product j 
2000 QDjE 
QDjU 
QDjR 
J1=3.20, J2=0.01, J3=4.30, J4=0.20, J5=0.75
J1=0.15, J2=0.55, J3=0.20, J4=8.10, J5=0.05
J1=0.15, J2=0.04, J3=1.00, J4=0.40, J5=9.90
Initial equilibrium 
quantity  
supplied of product j 
2001 QSjE 
QSjU 
QSjR 
J1=3.0, J3=5.5
J2=0.5, J4=7.5 
J5=10.3
Initial equilibrium 
quantity  
demanded of product j 
2001 QDjE 
QDjU 
QDjR 
J1=2.70, J2=0.01, J3=4.30, J4=0.20, J5=0.75
J1=0.15, J2=0.45, J3=0.20, J4=6.90, J5=0.05
J1=0.15, J2=0.04, J3=1.00, J4=0.40, J5=9.50
Initial equilibrium 
quantity  
supplied of product j 
2007 QSjE 
QSjU 
QSjR 
J1=4.0, J3=7.0
J2=0.6, J4=7.7 
J5=13.9
Initial equilibrium 
quantity  
demanded of product j 
2007 QDjE 
QDjU 
QDjR 
J1=3.70, J2=0.01, J3=5.80, J4=0.20, J5=1.10
J1=0.15, J2=0.55, J3=0.20, J4=7.10, J5=0.20
J1=0.15, J2=0.04, J3=1.00, J4=0.40, J5=12.6
Initial equilibrium 
quantity  
supplied of product j 
2008  QSjE 
QSjU 
QSjR 
J1=4.0, J3=7.2
J2=0.6, J4=8.3 
J5=14.0
Initial equilibrium 
quantity  
demanded of product j 
2008  QDjE 
QDjU 
QDjR 
J1=3.70, J2=0.01, J3=6.00, J4=0.20, J5=1.10
J1=0.15, J2=0.55, J3=0.20, J4=7.40, J5=0.20
J1=0.15, J2=0.04, J3=1.00, J4=0.70, J5=12.7
 
a There are five processed tomato products in our model: J1 represents a canned tomato product 
produced and exported by the EU; J2 represents a canned tomato product produced and exported 
by the United States; J3 represents a tomato paste product produced and exported by the EU; J4 
represents a tomato paste product produced and exported by the United States; and J5 represents 
a tomato paste product produced and exported by the rest-of-the-world region.
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 Table 5. EU support in the processing tomato sector 
 
Year 
 
Subgroupa Share
(%)
Processor 
aid
(€ per ton)
Paste 
Price
(€ per ton)
Applied 
rateb 
(%) 
αJ1E 
αJ3E 
1997 L 40 268 750 100 0.357
 A 40 268 750 50 0.179
 G 20 268 750 89 0.318
 All 100 268 750  0.278
2000 L 20 172 710 100 0.242
 A 40 172 710 50 0.121
 G 40 172 710 64 0.154
 All 100 172 710  0.158
Year Subgroup Share
(%)
Grower
payment
(€ per ton)
Tomato 
Price
(€ per ton)
Applied 
ratec 
(%) 
δFE 
2001 All 100 34.50 81 100 0.426
2007 All 100 34.50 85 98 0.398
2008 All 100 34.50 92 50 0.188
 
a Subgroup classifications are used in the pre-2001 period to describe the processing plants that 
produced less than (L), at (A), and greater than (G) quota entitlement. 
b The applied rate of support for group G in the pre-2001 period is calculated using Equation (3). 
c The applied rate of support for processing tomatoes in 2007 is 98% because the grower 
payment in Spain was reduced by 10% because they produced in excess of their threshold 
quantity.  Combining a 10% reduction in grower payments with Spain’s share of EU production 
in 2007 yields approximately a 2% reduction in the EU applied rate.
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 Table 6.  Simulated effects from changes to EU domestic support 
Remove EU price support in: Region/Variables 
1997 2000 2001 2007 2008 
Percent Change EU 
Tomato pricea –26.1 –15.3 –18.4 –16.8 –7.9
Tomato production –12.9 –7.6 –9.1 –8.3 –3.9
Canned price 11.0 6.6 –1.6 –1.2 –0.5
Canned production –21.9 –14.2 24.7 22.8 10.8
Paste price 7.5 4.5 7.5 7.4 3.5
Paste production –8.4 –4.2 –27.4 –25.0 –11.8
Change in million euro EU 
Producer surplus –205.0 –150.9 –159.9 –188.1 –91.7
Consumer surplus –120.3 –103.8 –15.3 –26.4 –15.7
Taxpayer surplus 408.4 292.1 241.9 292.3 146.2
Net economic surplus 83.1 37.3 66.8 77.8 38.9
Percent Change U.S. 
Tomato price 3.3 1.9 1.6 1.5 0.8
Tomato production 1.7 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.4
Canned price 2.1 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.5
Canned production 5.2 2.9 2.6 2.4 1.1
Paste price 2.6 1.5 1.2 1.2 0.6
Paste production 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.4
Change in million euro U.S. 
Producer surplus 24.1 15.1 10.7 11.0 6.3
Consumer surplus –30.9 –20.1 –11.0 –12.1 –6.8
Taxpayer surplus –4.9 –2.8 0.1 –0.1 0.1
Net economic surplus –11.7 –7.7 –0.2 –1.2 –0.5
Percent Change ROW 
Tomato price 5.3 3.1 3.2 3.2 1.5
Tomato production 3.2 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.9
Paste price 3.5 2.0 2.1 2.1 1.0
Paste production 3.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0
Change in million euro ROW 
Producer surplus 25.3 19.0 19.1 25.6 12.4
Consumer surplus –36.1 –26.2 –23.4 –28.8 –14.9
Taxpayer surplus –14.3 –8.4 –5.5 –5.7 –2.2
Net economic surplus –24.9 –15.7 –9.7 –8.8 –4.7
 
a The reported value is the change in the price received by tomato growers; removing domestic 
support during the 2001 to 2008 period would also increase the processor price for tomatoes. 
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Figure 1.  Net marginal costs for EU processed tomato products: 1978 to 2000 
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Figure 2.  Aggregate effect of the EU processor aid: 1978 to 2000  
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